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Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal
but Excessive Sentences
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller*
Mr. Mueller traces the development of the technique of sentence
appeals in relation to the evolution of penological theory and
examines the practices of representativeAmerican jurisdictions in
this area. In evaluating the status of the law, the author's reasoned
judgment is that too few appellate courts have the power to review
excessive sentences, and that even these courts do not exercise
their power in terms of functional penology.
I. INTRODUCION

The year 1960 marked the centenary of the first grant of power to an
American appellate court to review legally valid sentences attacked as
excessive in the particular case. It was the Iowa legislature which in
1860 authorized its supreme court to concern itself with penological problems through the power to reduce the punishment-but not to increase it.'
The century which has passed since this revolutionary innovation has witnessed more progress in penology than perhaps the entire preceding history
of humanity. It is fitting, therefore, that at the beginning of the second
century of appellate review of legal but "excessive" sentences we pause to
reflect on the past and to speculate on the future.
It cannot be our objective to give an account of the minutiae of the rules
which have developed over these one hundred years, for this has been done
-and quite successfully-by Professor Livingston Hall in 1937, at least for
a limited number of jurisdictions. 2 Rather, it shall be our endeavor to
*Professor of Law; Director, Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York University. Prepared with the gratefully acknowledged research assistance of Messrs.
Donald A. Statland and Irving Goldstein, who also deserve the credit for compiling the
table in Appendix A.
1. Iowa Code § 4925 (1860). For the present version of this law, see IowA CoDE
ANx. § 793.18 (1946).
2. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal (pts. 1-2), 37 CoLum. L. REv.
521, 762 (1937); see also Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of
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trace the development of the technique of sentence appeals in broad
strokes, to relate this development to the evolution of penological theory,
and to give an accurate account of the present state of the law in American
jurisdictions. Indeed, to relate the history of sentence appeals is to relate
the history of penology, for nowhere is penological thought and practice as
accurately mirrored as in sentencing policies and laws and, especially, in
appellate reflections thereon, i.e., reflections coming from the most sophisticated segment of the judiciary. Yet, these reflections are rarely expressed
in words. We must look to the actions of appellate tribunals and we must
read the thoughts between the lines of appellate opinions in order to gain
an accurate and complete view of the judges' penal philosophies. But it
should be granted that occasionally appellate judges will spell out the
thoughts-or at least some of them-which they entertained when deciding
to act on the charge of an excessive sentence.
II. DmrELOPu~mNT OiF APPFA.LS

A popular justice, unswervingly convinced of the reason and reasonability
of twelve-or any number of-peers, needs no appellate review to an
authority higher than the people. The vox populorum is final. Such was true
of the early Roman law,3 as well as early common law.4 Indeed, the English
common law was exceedingly slow in recognizing any judicial review in
criminal cases. 5 When appellate review was finally recognized, it was not a
matter of right, but was permitted only upon consent of the Crown.6 Not
until 1705 did review upon request become permissible in cases involving
7
misdemeanors, and felons -did not have the right of appeal until 1907. Of
Criminal Sentences, 21 BRooxLYN L. REV. 2 (1954); Watkins, Appellate Review of
Sentencing Process in Michigan, 36 U. DET. L.J. 356 (1959); Comment, 69 YALE L.J.
1453 (1960); 46 IOWA L. REv. 159 (1960).

3. During the Roman monarchy the last step of a criminal proceeding was the
provocatio, i.e., appeal to the people following a trial before the King or judicial
authority instituted by him (e.g., the royal consilium, the duumviri perdueUionis or the
quaestores parricidii). Lwvrus I, 26. During the republic the trial jurisdiction passed to
the people, where it was exercised either by the people as a whole or by a permanent group of popular representatives (quaestiones perpetuae) consisting-in our
terminology-of judge and jury; consequently, the right to an appeal ceased, although
the people might pardon a convicted criminal. 2 SHERmAN, RomAN LAW IN 'riE
MODERN WoLD 433-38 (3d ed. 1937).
4. The "appear' of felony or larceny and similar proceedings (which was not an
"appeal" in the modem sense), in vogue during the Saxon and early Norman periods
of England, was soon replaced by jury trial, and from that there was no appeal to
higher authority, other means of disciplining jurors for conceivable neglect of duty
then being in use. OmFxrD, CnmiNL APPEFALs IN AMmuCA 14-25 (1939).
5. PLiT
r, A CoNcisE HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAw 213 (5th ed. 1956);
1 HoLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAV 214-16 (7th ed. 1956); 2 PoLLocK &
MArr.,,
THE HSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 664 (2d ed. 1898); Sobeloff, supra note 2.
6. PLJuCNErr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 213.
7. 46 IowA L. REv., supra note 2, at 160; Regina v. Paty, 2 Salk. 503, 91 Eng.
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course, once appellate remedies for the correction of errors of law below
were recognized, an "unlawful" sentence was obviously subject to appeal,
though, at the beginning, the courts were not at all certain as to what the
disposition should be. For example, in King v. Ellis the defendant had been
sentenced to fourteen years of transportation beyond the seas, when the
statute provided for a maximum of only seven years. On behalf of the
Crown it was suggested that the court should let the sentence stand as
to seven years, or remand for resentencing. But the court rejected both
ideas: "If the prisonor [sic] is sent out of the country for fourteen years,
who is to say that he is to be discharged at the end of seven?" Furthermore,
the court said "that [a] judgment being erroneous, we think there is no
ground to send it back to be amended. The consequence is, that the
judgment pronounced by the Court below must be reversed," and the
defendant was discharged.8 A similar situation arose in King v. Bourne,
and the court relied upon King v. Ellis as authority. The court added that
it did not have the power to modify the sentence itself, and that precedent
for any other mode of proceeding was wanting.9
It thus became the established practice in England to review illegal
sentences in the same manner as any other error of law below, and to discharge the defendant completely if the sentence was indeed illegal. 10
The early American practice was entirely in accord with the early English
practice." But such a "windfall" procedure did not recommend itself to
the popular dictates of justice,' 2 and now it is generally accepted that
appellate courts have the power to provide for the correction of sentences
which exceed statutory limitations.' 3 The courts employ two methods: the
Rep. 431 (K.B. 1705) (misdemeanors); Criminal Appeals Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c.
23, § 3 (felonies). This latter statute gave a "right of appeal to the Court of Criminal

Appeal against conviction and sentence . . . to any person convicted on indictment
except in the case of a . . . sentence fixed by law." 10 HALsBuRy, LAws oF ENGLAND
521 (3d ed. 1955).
8. King v. Ellis, 5 B. & C. 395, 399-400, 108 Eng. Rep. 147, 149 (K.B. 1826).
9. King v. Bourne, 7 Ad. & E. 58, 112 Eng. Rep. 393 (K. B. 1837).

10. 46 IowA L. REv., supra note 2, at 159.
11. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. 419 (1841); Elliott v. People, 13 Mich.

365 (1865); ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 101.
12. For a discussion of the process involved by which the appellate courts assumed

power to correct illegal sentences, see OrIELD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 101-02;
Watkins, supra note 2, at 359-64 (with particular emphasis on Michigan's attempt to

allow appellate courts to affirm the legal part of the sentence, and reverse as to the
excess without releasing the defendant); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 424-32,
170 A.2d 830, 836-40 (Super. Ct. 1961) (the court, in determining that it has the right

to review legal but excessive sentences, reviews the history of the appellate review of
sentences in New Jersey).
13. 46 IowA L. REv., supra note 2, at 160;

OpFIELD,

op. cit. supra note 4, at 101;

Annot., 89 A.L.R. 295, 296 (1934); ABo-rr, CRvvnNAL TRIAL PRAcTIcE § 789, at
1447 (4th ed. 1939); Johnson v. United States, 32 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1929); Goode
v. United States, 12 F.2d 742 (8th Cir. 1926); Salazar v. United States, 236 Fed.
541 (8th Cir. 1916).
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case may be remanded for resentencing, 4 or the appellate court may
modify the sentence itself and affirm the judgment as so modified.' 5 The
latter method has the stamp of approval of the American Lav Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure. 6
A society which predetermines "justice" prospectively by legislationthereby equating justice and positive legality and balancing justice with
value and punishment with harm-needs no appellate power beyond that of
reviewing the legality of the sentence and proceedings below, for a legal
sentence is bound to be a just sentence. This is classical penology, a
philosophy which has few, if any, ambitions (perhaps for want of knowledge
and sophistication) to use the power to punish as a socio-political manipulant, or at least which thinks of manipulation only on the legislative level
(viz., when deciding upon the "appropriate" punishment which a given
crime type may call for). Such was the Anglo-American penal law of the
early nineteenth century.
III. EVOLUION

OF REVIEW OF LEGAL BUT ExcEssIVE SENTENcEs

Classicism in penology, which seeks to assess for each crime its "juste
punishment, began to wither away with the growth of the conviction that
no statutory definition of a crime is narrow enough to encompass only one
class of evil acts or evildoers. The premeditated killing by a highwayman
is not like the premeditated killing by a deserted, desperate and destitute
mother of her illegitimate and deformed child, and the animus furandi
of the thief of a shipload of Canadian fur is unlike the animus furandi of
the desperate wench who takes a rabbit skin to keep her child from
freezing. And thus, while classic penology kept insisting that the punishment must be apportioned in accordance with the harm created and the
animus which accompanies wrong-doing, it had to admit that these objectives cannot be achieved with a penal code which posits one and the
same punishment for a vast act-group broadly defined. It thus became
necessary to permit discretion in sentencing and, consequently, the nineteenth century witnessed the growth of the system of alternate punishments
and "minimax" statutes.1 7
But as soon as a legal system recognizes the need for determining the
14. Millich v. United States, 282 Fed. 604 (9th Cir. 1922); Dorsey v. State, 179
Ind. 531, 100 N.E. 369 (1913); Kennedy v. State, 62 Ind. 136 (1878); State v. Tyree,
70 Kan. 203, 78 Pac. 525 (1904); State v. Garton, 102 N.J.L. 318, 133 At. 403
(Ct. Err. &App. 1926).
15. Salazar v. United States, supra note 13; Burch v. State, 55 Ala. 136 (1870);
Indian Fred v. State, 36 Ariz. 48, 282 Pac. 930 (1929); Russell v. State, 112 Ark. 282,
166 S.W. 540 (1914) (illegal amount reduced to legally permissible amount).
16. ALl CODE OF CraeuNAL PnOCEanun § 459(1) (1930).
17. Le., those setting minimum and maximum punishments among which the court
must choose.
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"justice of the case," there will arise the need for some form of control over
the trial judge's discretion in imposing sentence, for the "justice of the
case" may strike different judges differently. What to one may be a ground
of mitigation may to another be a ground of aggravation. The result is
bound to be a vast disparity in sentencing within that frame of discretion
within which the judges are authorized to speak. The Iowa Code commissioners in discussing a proposal for the mandatory reporting of testimony
in all criminal cases, put their objective in these terms:
We propose to apply it to another equally important purpose, to allow

it to be used on an appeal to the Supreme Court, in order to remedy a
mischief universally admitted, we believe, to exist, viz.: the inequality of
punishment in cases of conviction in the different judicial Districts . . .
in one District, the Court will, perhaps, sentence the defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary for one year, whilst in another District, another defendant for a similar offense, committed under precisely similar
circumstances and accompanied with similar circumstances of aggravation
or alleviation, will be sentenced by the Court for two, three, four or five,
or more years,-and for this the law as it now stands affords no remedy,
but the pardoning power, vested in the Governor .... Is this as it ought to
be? We think it is not. [Under the proposed change] equality of punishments will be secured, at least, in a great measure. Inequality in this
respect is injustice. One tribunal can, at least, approximate to equality. 18
The objective of the Iowa Supreme Court-and the courts of those states
which, with or without statutes, followed the Iowa example-was quite
clear: it was "uniformity." And uniformity was understood to encompass
the differential treatment of cases which the legislature, by grouping them
as one and the same issue had regarded as substantially alike, and which,
on judicial examination, appear capable of sub-grouping. The judicial
task of creating uniformity, thus, was meant to be the ascertainment of
sub-group likeness, so as to permit the imposition of sub-group uniform
punishments within the legislatively established frame. Such uniformity, or
equalization, could be achieved only by a supreme tribunal with supervisory power over all trial courts.
Naturally, the task thus created for supreme courts was not an easy one.
Trial courts were (and still are) not in the habit of assigning specific reasons
for the particular sentence they impose. What standards should govern a
supreme court in its onerous task? In the late nineteenth century, the appellate courts would simply consider all the facts apparent from the trial
18. SMYTr,

BAnKER & DtAwiN, REPORT OF THE CODE COMMSSIONERS OF THE 8T9
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF IowA 117-18 (1859), as quoted in Hall, supra
note 2, at 762-63. (Italics in original.) For an excellent bibliography dealing with sentence disparities see Disparity in Sentencing of Convicted Defendants, in INsTrruTE OF
JUDicrAL ADMINISTrATION (1954). For federal recognition of the problem of the disGENERAL

parity of criminal sentences see Doub, Recent Trends in the Criminal Law, 46 A.B.A.J.
139, 141 (1960).
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record. From these might be gleaned "the justice of the case," a relatively
objective (since typified) "justice." Inevitably, subjective elements would
enter into the determination; but during this entire early period of appellate review of "excessive" sentences, "uniformity" was regarded as a
jurisprudential goal itself, and this uniformity was determined on the basis
principally of the 'like act," rather than the "like actor."
The Iowa statute led to the passage of similar laws in a few other
jurisdictions,' 9 but we cannot speak of a marked trend at that time. In
nineteenth century America one was reluctant to disturb the discretion of
the trial judge; after all, he had the defendant before him, an opportunity
denied the appellate court. Of course, courts which were given the power
of sentence review exercised it sparingly, not to say formalistically, only in
cases of clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. Such
abuses were not easily proven. Strong showings of passion or prejudice
were usually required. 20
Those who had hoped that the introduction of the appellate sentence
review power would develop systems of jurisdiction-wide sentencing policies
or even penological theories and practices*were utterly disappointed. Nor,
indeed, can judges suffering from caseload burdens be expected to develop
such policies. Guide-lines must be established by others who are not
similarly handicapped, such as the scholarly branch of the profession.
Nevertheless, as we follow the sentence review decisions through the
decades, we can note a shift from the mere "justice of the case" practice
to more specific considerations of a policy nature. Professor Hall has
documented this shift in detail; he speculated for the first third of the
twentieth century that appellate courts cater to the retribution (he called
it vengeance) theory in cases evoking emotional reactions from the community, especially in homicide cases; that they cater to the neutralization
theory (the "recidivist" principle) in cases likely to lead to recidivism;
and that they cater to the deterrence theory if the crime2l is one which the
population is prone otherwise to commit. All three of these tendencies,
he felt, are subject to limitations imposed by the popular sense of justice.2
It remains to be seen whether such concern with only one of many
penological theories in a given case will satisfy the ends of penal policy.
While concern for the "generally preventive" aspects of punishment 3
has remained with us, the concern for the particular offender has grown
over the years. When Hall wrote his now classic article, judges and
19. Hall, supra note 2, at 522-23.
20. Id. at 526-28.
21. For an analysis of appellate review of legal but excessive sentences from the
point of view of the type of crime committed, rather than the particular jurisdiction,
see Annots., 29 A.L.R. 313, 321 (1924), 89 A.L.R. 295, 300 (1934).
22. Hall, supra note 2, at 782-83.
23. Those aimed at the community, rather than the specific offender.
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criminologists were earnestly emphasizing the search for the "ascertainable
reason for individualization." 24 During the second third of the twentieth
century, the practice of actor-related penology, as distinguished from actrelated penology, has been prominent. This was best expressed by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Green, a recent decision setting aside a sentence of capital punishment: "The court below in
determining the appropriate penalty considered the criminal act, but not
the criminal himself and in so doing committed an abuse of discretion."2 5

IV. AmnucAN

LAW ON SENTENCE

BIvirw

TODAY AND Tomomtow

Despite all penological advances, only fifteen American jurisdictions (and
England) have either specific statutes authorizing modification of a legal,
but excessive sentence, or precedents establishing such a procedure.2 6 The
remaining jurisdictions either have not had an opportunity to rule on this
question or have specifically negated the power of the appellate court so
to act. Since the law of each jurisdiction will be examined in detail in
Appendix B, we may here restrict the discussion to the practices of a few
representative jurisdictions.

A. States With Express Statutory Authorization
The State of Arizona exemplifies a jurisdiction which has specific statutory authorization of appellate modification of legal but excessive sentences.
The statute provides:
Upon an appeal from the judgment or from the sentence on the ground
that it is excessive, the court shall have the power to reduce the extent or
duration of the punishment imposed, if, in its opinion, the conviction is
proper, but the punishment imposed is greater than under the circumstances
of the case ought to be inflicted. In such a case, the supreme court shall
impose any legal sentence, not more severe than that originally imposed,
which in its opinion is proper. Such sentence shall be enforced by the court
from which the appeal was taken. 27
Such a statute permits the widest possible latitude. Perhaps the appellate
power to substitute its own sentence is undesirably broad, absent mandatory
provisions under which the trial judge must submit an opinion in which he
assigns the reasons for the sentence he has imposed. For, if the appellate
tribunal must operate by guess or from chance remarks and circumstances,
it might be better to remand the case for resentencing upon full considera24. Hall, supra note 2, at 763.
25. 396 Pa. 137, 150, 151 A.2d 241, 247 (1959).
26. See Appendices for details: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, United States federal jurisdiction.
27. Amz. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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tion of all factors, rather than to reduce the sentence at the highest level.
As for the particular Arizona statute, we have no indication that it has
led to incongruous dispositions. As a matter of fact, the Arizona Supreme
Court has been extremely conservative in its application.p
Hawaii, similarly, has a statute which authorizes the state supreme court
"in a criminal case, if in its opinion the sentence is illegal or excessive,
...
[to] correct the sentence to correspond with the verdict of finding or
reduce the same ... ' This statute has been correctly interpreted as
authorizing modification of legal but excessive sentences by the Hawaii
Supreme Court.30
The appellate courts of Connecticut and Massachusetts (like the English
courts3l) have the specific statutory power to review, to decrease and
even to increase sentences imposed below.32 In both states the grant of
these powers is implemented by a unique procedure for sentence review.
Following the example set by Massachusetts in 1943,3 the Connecticut
legislature established a review division composed of three judges of the
superior court in a state-wide court of original jurisdiction.M With the
exception of minor differences,3 the procedures followed in the two states
are similar. The judges meet on an informal basis with the defendant or
his counsel and a representative of the prosecuting authority. The trial
judge may be consulted. The existence of this review body in no way
affects any other procedural remedies.
This new approach to the problem of sentence review has not gone
unnoticed, for at least two additional states have established committees to
study the feasibility of adopting a similar procedure.3 6
28. State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 360 P.2d 479 (1961). The sentence was not
excessive merely because it did not give the defendant, a first offender, the minimum
sentence; nor could the punishment be regarded as "cruel and unusual," since it was
within statutory limits; nor does the fact that others, apparently less worthy than
defendant, have received lesser sentences, mean that the defendant is denied due
process or equal protection of the laws.
29. HAw,Au Rv. LAws § 212-14 (1955).

30. Territory v. Masami Idemota, 39 Hawaii 152 (Cir. Ct. 1951); Territory v.
Kunimoto, 37 Hawaii 591 (Cir. Ct. 1947).

31. Criminal Appeals Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(3); 10 HArLsBurY, LAws or
541-42 (3d ed. 1955). A summary of the English practice is found in The
Principles of Passing Sentence, as Shown by Cases in the Court of Criminal Appeals,
86 JusT. P. 61, 75, 87 (1922).
32. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-196 (1958); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. c. 278, §
28B (1956); see also Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission § 39 (1901), vhich
allowed an appellate court to increase a legal but excessive sentence.
33. MAss. ANN.LAWS c. 278, §§ 28 A-D (1956).
34. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-194 to -197 (1958). For a discussion of the
Connecticut procedure see Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
ENGLAND

35. PRELmINARY REPORT OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAn ASSOCA71rON SPECL. COMTo STUoY TnE REVImW OF SENTENCEs IN CanmrNAL CAsES (1962) (mlmco)

mrmm

[hereinafter cited as MARYr.YAND REPORT].

36.

REPORT OF NEW JEasE

SUPREME COURTS COmmrr

ON CRIMIAL PROCEDUnr
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It should be pointed out, however, that while years ago no serious
constitutional questions would have arisen, 37 at least as far as these statutes
are concerned, contemporary constitutional doctrine may well result in the
8
unconstitutionality of the appellate power to increase the sentence.

B. States With Implied Statutory Authorization
The New York statute bestows upon its appellate tribunals the power of
appellate sentence review in a covert manner:
Upon hearing the appeal the appellate court may, in cases where an
erroneous judgment has been entered upon a lawful verdict, or finding of
fact, correct the judgment to conform to the verdict or finding; in all other
cases they must either reverse or affirm the judgment or order appealed
from or reduce the sentence imposed to a sentence not lighter than the
minimum penalty provided by law for the offense of which the defendant or
and in cases of reversal, may, if necessary
defendants have been convicted
39
or proper, order a new trial.

The term "erroneous" used in the first part of the statute appears to
authorize review of illegal sentences, while "all other cases" has been

interpreted to include legal but excessive sentences, so that the New York
appellate courts do have the power of appellate review of excessive sen-

tences. 40 Note should be taken of a New York peculiarity. The reviewing
power of the New York Court of Appeals (the highest state court) is

limited by a constitutional provision.4 ' On the basis of this limitation it has
been held that, save for capital cases, the court of appeals has no power to
(1961) (mimeo). With reference to the State of Maryland, see

MARYLAND

REFORT,

op. cit. supra note 35.
37. For a discussion of the constitutional questions see Ocampo v. United States,
234 U.S. 91 (1914) (holding the Philippine Act constitutional, as applied to a
defendant whose punishment had been increased after sentence appeal); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (holding Philippine Act unconstitutional under
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, but only insofar as the act
allows sentence increase upon appeal by the government).
38. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), so far extending only to
situations involving different degrees of the crime, not yet solving the question where
the penalty increase is within the same degree of the crime. Conceivably, however,
the double jeopardy prohibition may extend that far.
39. N.Y. CoDE Cnm . Pnoc. § 543(1). (Emphasis added.)
40. People v. Potskowski, 298 N.Y. 299, 83 N.E.2d 125 (1948) (court of appeals
affirming the right of the appellate division to extend mercy by reducing a legal but
excessive sentence); People v. Gold, 7 App. Div. 2d 739, 180 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1958)
(appellate division reducing a legal but excessive sentence); People v. Pannone, 8
App. Div. 2d 608, 184 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1959) (on the basis of the court reports and
probation record, appellate division modifying a judgment so as to allow separate
sentences to run concurrently, rather than consecutively); People v. Downs, 5 App.
Div. 2d 935, 172 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1958).
41. See N.Y. CoxsT. art. VI, § 7, providing that, with the exception of a judgment
of death, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is limited to the review of questions of
law.
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review the appropriateness of discretionary sentences.4 Therefore, the review of legal but excessive sentences in New York is limited to the appellate
division of the supreme court, except for capital punishment.
Arkansas also has a generally worded statute, judicially interpreted to
authorize appellate review of legal but excessive sentences. The statute
reads:
The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order

appealed from, in whole or in part and as to any or all parties, and when

the judgment or order has been reversed, or affirmed, the Supreme Court
may remand or dismiss the cause and enter such judgment upon the record
as it may in its discretion deem just . . .. 43

The Arkansas courts have unhesitatingly accepted this statute as authorization of appellate review of legal but excessive sentences. 44
Idaho has a similar statute, which reads as follows: "The court may
reverse, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or
dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if proper, order a new
trial."45 In Idaho, however, the court assumes its right to modify a legal,
but excessive sentence without the slightest mention of statutory authority.40
The last state to be discussed in this group is Pennsylvania. The statute
provides: "The supreme court ... shall have power... , as well in criminal
as in civil pleas or proceedings, . . . to reverse, modify, or affirm . . .
judgments ... as the law doth or shall direct ... ."47 On the basis of this

statute, the court for the first time exercised its discretion in reversing a
legal but excessive sentence in Commonwealth v. Garramone.48 The defendant, upon arriving home, found that his son had been beaten by a
neighbor. The defendant was so provoked by seeing his family in a near
state of shock that he took the law into his own hands and shot the
agitator. Upon review of the death sentence imposed by the trial court,
the supreme court held that an abuse of discretion had occurred. The
court said that the trial judge abused his authority by not considering the
provoking circumstances of the crime, as well as the favorable background
of the defendant. It thereupon reversed and remanded with instructions
that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment.
This view was followed in the much discussed 49 case of Commonwealth
42. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180 (1958); People v.
Speiser, 277 N.Y. 342, 14 N.E.2d 380 (1938).
43. ARK. STAT. § 27-2144 (1947).
44. Hadley v. State, 196 Ark. 307, 117 S.W.2d 352 (1938); Simpson v. State, 56
Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99, 102 (1892); Gugson v. State, 257 S.W.2d 1021 (1952).
45. ID.Aso CoDE ANN. § 19-2821 (1947).
46. State v. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 Pac. 860, rehearingdenied, 91 Pac. 318 (1907).
47. PA. STAT. tit. 17,-§ 41 (1936).

48. 307 Pa. 507, 161'-Atl. 733 (1932); see also Annot., 89 A.L.R. 295 (1934).
49. Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 111, 139 (1959).
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v. Green, 50 decided in 1959. There the appellate court found that the trial
court had abused its discretion by determining the sentence on the basis of
the criminal act alone, not having considered the criminal himself.
The defendant Green was a boy with an I.Q. of 80, convicted of murder
and sentenced to end his life at the age of fifteen. The majority of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found age and I.Q. to have been the only
subjective factors which the trial court considered in the exercise of its
statutorily imposed discretion to impose the death penalty. One trial judge,
however, had considered that Green was part of a crime wave caused by
juvenile delinquents. The court's dissenter believed that other subjective
factors were considered by the trial court, i.e., the defendant's troubled
history, e.g., the psychological report indicating that "social mores were not
taught by his family." Obviously, the dissent wanted to make the point that
the trial court exercised proper judicial discretion with many subjective factors before it. The majority found an abuse of discretion in not considering
enough subjective factors. The third possibility, overlooked by both
majority and dissent, would have been to find that the trial court abused
its discretion because, on the subjective factors before it, the defendant's
punishment should not have been death, since, e.g., he certainly cannot be
blamed for not having received any moral education from his parents. 5'
The effect of this decision is to create a presumption in favor of the
defendant, so that the death penalty is imposable "only when it is the
sole penalty justified both by the criminal act and the criminal himself
. "52

In 1959, the State of Pennsylvania amended its murder statute so as to
deprive the trial judge of his discretion in determining whether death or
life imprisonment shall be imposed. In cases where a jury trial is had, and
a verdict of murder in the first degree is entered, "the court shall proceed
to receive such additional evidence not previously received in the trial
as may be relevant and admissible upon the question of the penalty to be
imposed upon the defendant, and shall permit such argument by counsel,
and deliver such charge thereon as may be just and proper in the circumstances."53 In the event that the jury can not reach a decision on the
punishment imposed, "the court shall sentende the defendant to life imprisonment upon the verdict theretofore rendered by the jury, and recorded
as foresaid."54 The judge has the sole responsibility for selection of the
appropriate punishment only in cases decided without a jury.
The statute marks considerable progress in penological practice. At the
same time it must be admitted that it imposes serious burdens on the
50. 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959).
51. Mueller, supra note 49.
52. Commonwealth v. Green, supranote 50, at 247. (Emphasis added.)
53. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1959). (Emphasis added.) This statute follows
California practice. See CAL. Pxr!. CODE § 190.7 (Supp. 1959).
54. PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp. 1959).
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supreme court. For example, since the death penalty lacks any penological
basis, what factors, sociological or whatever else, should be considered in
selecting this man to'die and that man to live?
Nevertheless, the statute is a logical first step in the implementation of
the modem penal policy of imposing a socially useful punishment in each
case. It is clear that this cannot be done merely upon the evidence admissible on the question of the defendant's liability for the particular crime
charged. A separate hearing, after the issue of guilt has been established, is
therefore the most appropriate means for receiving evidence bearing solely
on the type and amount of punishment called for in the given case. While
we believe that the universal introduction of the split sentence statute applicable to all criminal cases would minimize the need for appellate review
of legal but excessive sentences, sound penological theory nevertheless
requires a supervision of the sentencing discretion. Indeed, unsupervised
discretion ceases to be discretion and becomes absolute power.
C. Appellate Review of Excessive Sentences by Case Law
As late as 1942 it had been relatively certain in New Jersey that an
appellate court may not review a legal sentence merely charged to be
excessive, since the quantum of the sentence, within the statutory framework, was subject to judicial discretion.55 But over the years the courts'
language sounded less and less emphatic. By 1957 it was said that, quite
apart from statutes, New Jersey appellate tribunals have the power to
correct not only illegal but also "improper" sentences; 56 and in 1961 this
power was actually exercised, in line with what appears to be a national
trend, albeit a slow one, statute or no statute. For example, the appellate
courts will now correct the sentence if it57was "very much greater than the
proper protection of society demands."
D. No Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences
In the vast majority of American states, penology has not yet entered
the supreme court temples. Montana is a demonstrative jurisdiction. The
Montana appeals statute, of long standing, grants the supreme court the
power to "reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order appealed from
...
or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent
upon, such judgment or order .... "58 Yet, despite such statute, the Montana Supreme Court thought itself without authority to modify or remand
a judgment, even though the sentence appeared greater than deserved.
55. State v. Newman, 128 N.J.L. 82, 88, 24 A.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
56. State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505-06, 129 A.2d 715, 721 (1957).
57. State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830, 840 (Super. Ct. 1961)
(quoting Montalto v. State, 51 Ohio App. 6, 199 N.E. 198, 200 (Ct. App. 1935)).
58. MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-821Q (1947).
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The court felt disinclined to tamper with what it regarded to be executive
prerogative. 59
E. FederalLaw
The Judicature Act of 187960 allowed the old circuit courts to review
and modify legal but excessive sentences as well as illegal sentences imposed
by lower federal courts. 61 In 1881, when the appellate jurisdiction of the
circuit courts was transferred to the circuit courts of appeals, no similar
power was given to these new courts. The review power was deemed
abrogated,62 and such was the, unquestioned law until 1960, when the
landmark case of United States v. Wiley reached the Seventh Circuit for
the second time.6 3 The defendant had pleaded not guilty to a charge of
knowing possession of an interstate shipment of stolen goods. He was
tried before a judge and sentenced to three years of imprisonment, and his
request for probation was denied. The case went on appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appeals judges indicated that they
would have granted probation had they been in the district court's place,
but found that failure to grant probation did not amount to an abuse of
discretion. Nevertheless, they regarded the legal sentence as excessive,
basing their view on the facts, revealed by the trial record, that the defendant was a minor without prior conviction, whereas the "ringleader,"
who had four previous felony convictions, had been sentenced to only two
years in the penitentiary. The court added that the defendant's not guilty
plea should not prejudice his standing. 64 The three-year sentence was set
aside and the case was remanded "for a proper sentence not inconsistent
with the views herein expressed."65
On remand the district court questioned the legality of the court of
appeals' disposition. 66 It reaffirmed its belief in the propriety of the threeyear sentence and reimposed it. But, "out of my deep respect for the Court
of Appeals, and in obedience to its mandate, I also hereby suspend the
execution of the said sentence," 7 the trial judge related.
This, then, is the first rumbling presaging a conceivable penological
eruption in the federal appellate courts. Despite recent avowals to the
59. State v. Shaffer, 59 Mont. 403, 197 Pac. 986 (1921).
60. Ch. 176, § 1, 20 Stat. 354.
61. United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v. United States,
10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
62. Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. 473 (9th Cir. 1900).
63. 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960). See Comment, 10 DE PAUL L. lMv. 104, 105
(1960); Note, 109 U. PA. L. Bxv. 422 (1961).
64. On this point see also the first appeals decision, United States v. Wiley, 267
F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1959).
65. United States v. Wiley, supra note 63.
66. United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. IR. 1960).

67. Id. at 688.
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contrary,8 the Supreme Court of the United States may then have to
enter the realm of penology after all.
V. EVALUATION

To the superficial observer the trend toward appellate review of legal
sentences may seem a penologically sound development. Is it sound as
currently practiced and as currently possible?
Let us first glance briefly at the common objections voiced against the
practice, so as to test their substantiality.
(1) It has been said that this power disturbs the executive prerogative
69
With due
to dispense mercy in the form of pardons and reprieves.
has
restraint,
legal
any
to
subject
being
respect, the executive pardon, not
is
a
Sentencing
hand.
at
absolutely nothing to do with the problem
a
discretionary
with
is
vested
judicial problem, and as long as the judiciary
range of sentences, there must be some guard against a possible abuse of
such discretion, just as there is appellate supervision over every other
exercise of judicial discretion.
(2) It has been argued that the review power is inconsistent with the
trial judge's discretion. But there is no such thing as an unsupervised discretion; it would be anarchy. This argument could only be made, it would
70
seem, by those who are unaware of the dimensions of "discretion."
(3) One argument which conceivably could be made is a formalistic
one. It might be argued that statutes authorizing appellate courts to affirm,
modify or reverse "judgments" are not designed to cover like power with
respect to sentences. Such an argument would overlook the fact that the
sentence is an integral part of the judgment, at least according to the better
71
authorities.
(4) Some statutes employing the term "modify" have been construed
72
It
as not authorizing appellate courts to modify excessive sentences.
"to
mean
not
does
if
it
means
"modify"
what
might be asked, however,
68. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
69. Watldns, Appellate Review of Sentencing Process in Michigan, 36 U. Dmr. L.J.
356, 375 (1960); 46 IowA L. REv. 159, 165-66 (1960); Cummins v. People, 42
Mich. 142, 3 N.W. 305 (1879); People v. Freleigh, 344 Mich. 306, 54 N.W.2d 599
(1952).
70. Watldns, supra note 69, at 369, 377; Cummins v. People, 42 Mich. 142, 144,
3 N.W. 305 (1879) ("the statute gives a wide discretionary power to the trial court
upon the supposition that it will be judicially exercised in view of all the facts and
circumstances appearing at the trial"). See OPxeLD, CvmINAL APPEAs rN AmEIUCA

104-05 (1939); 46 IowA L. REv., supra note 69, at 165.

71. Citations, pro and con, are collected in OnPrxLD, CRMmNAL PRocEDURE FRold
ARREsT TO APPEAL 535-37 (1947).

72. Watldns, supra note 69, at 374; ORFIr=,
IowA L. REv., supra note 69, at 165.

op. cit. supra note 70, at 104-05; 46
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modify." It would seem that lack of statutory authorization cannot be
seriously argued where such terminology is used.
(5) It is said that an appellate tribunal is handicapped in not having
had the benefit of personal observation of the defendant in court and that
it has insufficient information from below on which to render an intelligent
decision on the sentence entered. 73 This argument seems to be directed
primarily against the substitution of a new sentence by the appellate
court itself, as distinguished from a remand for possible resentencing.
Even so, while it is true that the appellate court can act only on what is
sent before it, there is no reason why trial judges cannot be ordered to
detail their observations and data on which they based the sentence, e.g.,
pre-sentence investigation reports. This report and the judge's opinion
then should become part of the record on appeal (as it already is in many
jurisdictions) .74
(6) If no further arguments were available against appellate review of
excessive sentences, one might well embrace the new policy without
hesitation. But there remains the argument forcefully made in a recent
leading article, an argument striking at the heart of the matter: 5
Appellate courts seem ill-adapted to the function of reviewing and revising the sentences of trial judges, besides being too preoccupied with other
functions. The creation of a new authority, with the single responsibility of
equalizing sentences initially imposed, to the end of assuring that they
reflect uniform concepts of degrees of blameworthiness, is a tempting pospresently
sibility. Short of this expedient, the only institutional machinery
available in most American legal systems is the parole board.76
While agreeing on the need for a central review agency, I beg to differ
in a number of material respects. Appellate courts are not too preoccupied
with "other functions." If law has drawn penology within its orbit, and
73. Sobeloff, A Recommendation of Appellate Review of Criminal Sentences, 21
Bnoo rx L. REv. 2, 10 (1954).
74. E.g., PA. Sup. CT. R. 30; Commonwealth v. Paul, 289 Pa. 453, 137 At. 606
(1927); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-210 (1958); N.Y. CODE Cmm. PNoc. § 485; People
v. Hogan, 245 App. Div. 790, 281 N.Y. Supp. 70 (1935).
75. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTFNIPn. PRoB. 401 (1958).
Recounting the detriments resulting from grievously disparate sentences as ruinous to
the convict's morale and conducive to prison riots, the author points to two conceivable
answers: "[E]ither by the laying down of quite precise rules of decision . . . , or by

subjecting heterogeneous discretionary decisions to review and revision by a single
tribunal, or in both ways." Id. at 440. "Guides for sentencing," it appears to us, are
perhaps more helpful to the trial judiciary than statutory lists of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, for no human ingenuity can list the multifariousness of
factors and circumstances which, in view of a multitude of correctional purposes, ought
to be considered.
For discussion of the relevant German Draft Code provisions see Mueller, The
German Draft Criminal Code 1960-An Evaluation in, Terms of American Criminal Law,
1961 U. IxL. L.F. 25, 32-33.
76. Hart, supra note 75, at 440.
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in providing for penal and correctional sentences it has done so, it is
obviously the duty of the appellate court to see to it that the law is properly
served. This is an appellate function. Indeed, it is the only one, and
appellate courts are not preoccupied with anything but that. True, appellate
judges are as unfamiliar with the precise aspects of penological science or
correctional theory as are trial judges. The answer is simple: if they are
untrained, they must be trained. If they are uninformed they must gain
this information. And, both trial and appellate judges must act with the
advice of professional penologists. Only such a system is in keeping with
the common law, a law which has been wisely hesitant to yield any of its
functions to "alienists" unfamiliar with legal technique and policy. Law
must remain the concern of the courts and penology has become law. We
need no new authority. We already have one.
But we now come to the crucial issue. Neither "uniformity," nor "degrees of blameworthiness" can be our aim, at least not our sole aim. To
be quite sure, blameworthiness is a prerequisite for the imposition of any
judgment of conviction in the first place, and we shall wholeheartedly endorse the need for a better consideration of differentiations, or degrees, of
the intensity and extent of blameworthiness (e.g., through providing for
degrees of crimes, through acceptance of the concepts of partial and
diminished responsibility). But all this, as of right and justice, ought to find
primary consideration at the stage of the verdict.
But what then ought to be the guide for. imposing the "appropriate"
judgment in the first place, and what similar guides must be used in reviewing the sentence?
When Professor Hall wrote his article, he said, in virtual desperation,
that "the factors to be considered are for the most part so numerous, and
their interaction is so complicated, that... legal rules may be impossible
to define." 77 And we still have not progressed beyond this bewilderment.
We can be certain only that the classical phase of penology, with its overemphasis on harm and acts 8 is a matter of the past and that the actorbound penology of the early twentieth century died with the positivism
which had given birth to it. Of course, our courts still consider the one
or the other. But today's criminology no longer can afford to be one-sided,
nor can it be two-faced. It must be all-embracing to accomplish its sole
purpose: to minimize, if not prevent entirely, the occurrence of crime in
this society. In other words, in imposing a sentence the trial judge, acting
on the best evidence available (probation reports, etc.), gathered after
verdict of guilty, must consider act and actor in the light of all the par77. Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, 37 COLrM. L. REV. 762, 767
(1937).
78. The classical penology found frequent expression in statutory and constitutional
provisions like that of W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 5, providing that "penalties shall
be proportioned to the character and degree of the offense."
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ticular demands of penal policy, which in combination aim at the prevention of crime. Nothing short of this will suffice in the effort to arrive at
that sentence within the legislatively created framework which the totality
of circumstances demands. While a listing of sentence-influencing elements
of act and actor is impossible-for they are as multifarious as life itself- 79
a list of the demands of penal policy is easily compiled. It includes the
demands of retribution-that inextricable feeling of justice which is very
much alive in our society, and which, as a moral agent, in the nature of
ethicized vengeance, supports the law (to psychiatrists it appears in the
individual and collective "super-ego"). It includes the demands of general
prevention (or general deterrence) which uses the individual defendant,
as a member of society with obligations toward it, as an object lesson for
his compatriots. And it includes the demands of special prevention, among
which we find the objectives of special deterrence, resocialization, neutralization and penitence. As has been demonstrated elsewhere in great detail,8 0
the modem penological machinery or penal technique cannot be operated
by the employment of any one lever. But even at the risk of calling forth
immediate adverse reactions on the part of "social-defense" penologists, I
must leave the remainder of the explanation unsaid in this connection and
cross-refer to previous publications. 8 '
What conclusions can we draw from this recognition insofar as appellate
review of "excessive" sentences is concerned? Rather than merely looking
to considerations of act or actor, the modem appellate court with review
power in each case coming before it for sentence review, must ask itself
this question: Does this sentence, as far as this convict in this society is
concerned, serve the functional purpose of general and special prevention
and accord with the popular retributive feeling of the community? If the
answer clearly is no on all the evidence on which the trial court acted
and which is now before the appellate court, an abuse of discretion has
occurred, and the appellate court must set aside the sentence and modi*
or remand, as the statute may provide.
As yet, only a few appellate courts have assumed or have been granted
the power of appellate review of "excessive" sentences. That their number
is bound to grow in the near future, no one doubts. And as yet none of
the courts with such power exercises it in terms of functional penology as
here outlined. But nothing short of it can possibly suffice!
79. And there is by no means unanimity on the effect (i.e., whether positive or
negative) any such factor has; for example, note the factor of "lack of moral educatioa" in Commonwealth v. Green, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
80. Mueller, The Many Dimensions of Punishment as a Social Tool, in P.RocEEDINGs
or Tm ATroRNxy GENmEAi's CONFMMC- ON Cmsu 1-16 (Lansing, Mich. 1961),

reproduced in Mueller, The Public Law of Wrongs-Its Concepts in the World of
Reality, 10 J.Pun. L. 202, 205-14 (1962).
81. Ibid. See also Hart, supra note 75, at 440.
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APPENDICES

Donald A. Statland and Irving Goldstein
A.
The following chart classifies the current law of the fifty American
states and the District of Columbia. Entries have been made for each
jurisdiction on whether appellate review of legal but excessive sentences
is available at all (column I), and, if so, on the type of disposition which
appellate courts are likely to make (column II).
In column I, the "yes" entries include those states in which the courts
have specifically held that a legal but excessive sentence is reviewable by
the appellate court, as well as states with statutes specifically authorizing
such action. The "no" entries list those jurisdictions which have specifically
denied themselves the power of appellate review of legal but excessive
sentences. The "undecided" jurisdictions are those on which clear authority
either way is not yet available.
I.
Availability of
Appellate Review
Yes

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

No

Undecided

II.
Type of Disposition
Reduced by appellate court Remanded
or remanded with specific for reinstructions
sentence
without
specific
instructions

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
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Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
District of
Columbia
Total

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

14

15

22

13

2

B.

No attempt has been made in this appendix to list all pertinent cases;
only representative decisions have been included.
ALABAMA
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 389 (1958) gives the appellate courts of Alabama the right
to "render such judgment as the law demands." This statute has not been interpreted.
According to the decisional law, there is no appellate review of legal but excessive
sentences. Ganey v. State, 36 Ala. App. 570, 60 So. 2d 861 (1952); Gilley v. State, 22
Ala. App. 184, 113 So. 650 (1927).
ALASKA
AL.Asr, CoMP. LAws ANN. § 69-6-11 (1949) allows the appellate courts, in cases of
criminal appeals, to correct errors in law appearing upon the face of the judgment,
or the proceedings connected therewith.
A case in point is City of Seldovia v. Lund, 138 F. Supp. 382 (D. Alaska 1956).
The defendant appealed the sentence on grounds of excessiveness. However, since he
had served his ten-day sentence, the court considered the question moot and dismissed the case.
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ARIZONA
Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956) gives the appellate courts power to
modify allegedly excessive sentences by imposing any legal sentence not more severe
than that originally imposed. The opinions have indicated that this power will be
exercised only when it appears that the sentence is excessive as a result of an abuse
of discretion. State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 360 P.2d 479 (1961). Cf. State v.
Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997 (1953), where the court reduced the sentence
from ten-twenty years to seven-ten years for rape, involving a 17-year-old defendant.
ARKANSAS
ARM STAT. § 27-2144 (1947) allows the reversal, affirmation, or modification of
judgments by the appellate courts. Although this is a civil statute, it has been held
to apply to criminal actions. Hadley v. State, 196 Ark. 307, 117 S.W.2d 352 (1938).
Upon finding a sentence to be excessive, the case may be remanded for resentencing,
Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S.W. 99 (1892), or the appellate court itself may
modify the sentence, Blake v. State, 186 Ark. 77, 52 S.W.2d 644 (1932).
CALIFORNIA
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1260. Despite this statute authorizing appellate court reviev of
legal but excessive sentences, some California decisions intimate that the statute
authorizes only appeals from a "judgment," and that a sentence is not part of a
"judgment." See People v. Dunlap, 12 Cal. App. 2d 333, 55 P.2d 522 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1936); People v. Ray, 13 Cal. App. 2d 701, 57 P.2d 975 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936);
People v. Kennedy, 120 Cal. App. 2d 793, 262 P.2d 24 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); People
v. Millum, 42 Cal. 2d 524, 267 P.2d 1039 (1954); People v. Pettyjohn, 172 Cal. App.
2d 188, 342 P.2d 416 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
Notwithstanding the supreme court decision of People v. Millum, supra, subsequent
intermediate appellate decisions have specifically said that the sentence in a criminal
action is the judgment, and an appeal lies from the judgment. People v. Tokich, 128
Cal. App. 2d 515, 275 P.2d 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); People v. Clarke, 146 Cal. App.
2d 904, 304 P.2d 271 (Super. Ct. 1956).
The California courts appear to allow review of a legal but excessive sentence, if it
is assumed that the sentence is a part of the judgment. People v. Harrison, 41 Cal.
2d 216, 258 P.2d 1016 (1953); People v. Rossi, 37 Cal. App. 778, 174 Pac. 916
(1918).
COLORADO
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-27
errors in criminal proceedings.
In Maynes v. People, 119 Colo.
relief from excessive sentences was
See also Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d

(1953) provides for appellate review of all legal
149, 200 P.2d 915 (1948), the court said that
a matter for the executive, and not the judiciary.
1028 (Colo. 1960).

CONNECTICUT
CoNr. GEN. STAT. § 51-196 (1958) provides for the increase or decrease of legal but
excessive sentences by the specially created review division of the superior court.
State v. Tirella, 22 Conn. Supp. 25, 158 A.2d 602 (Super. Ct. 1959) and State v.
Gonski, 21 Conn. Supp. 468, 159 A.2d 182 (Super. Ct. 1958) exemplify appellate
court reduction of legal sentences. See text for further discussion of Connecticut
procedure.
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DELAWARE
No statute or case could be found authorizing review of a legal but excessive
sentence. However, DEL. SUPER. CT. (Cirv.) R. 35(a), although apparently authorizing
correction of illegal sentences, does suggest that a legal sentence may be reviewed
by authorizing review of sentences which violate constitutional rights or are subject
to any other collateral attack.
FLORIDA
Where a sentence is within the statutory limit, the extent of it cannot be reviewed
on appeal regardless of existence or nonexistence of mitigating circumstances. Davis
v. State, 123 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1960); LePrell v. State, 124 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
GEORGIA
A sentence within statutory limits will not be set aside as excessive or as cruel and
unusual punishment. See Curtis v. State, 102 Ga. App. 790, 116 S.E.2d 264 (1960);
Brown v. State, 149 Ga. 816, 102 S.E. 449 (1920). See GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, 1111
9, 21.
HAWAII
LA:ws § 212-14 (1955). Territory v. Kunimoto, 37 Hawaii 591 (1947)
discusses Hawaii Rev. Laws § 9564 (1945), which is restated in section 212-14 of the
1955 revision. See Territory v. Masami Idemota, 39 Hawaii 152 (1951).
HAwAII REV.

IDAHO
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2821 (1947). "The court may reverse, affirm, or modify the
judgment or order appealed from, and may set aside, affm or modify any or all of the
proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and may, if
proper, order a new trial." In State v. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 Pac. 860, rehearing
denied, 91 Pac. 318 (1907), the court remanded with directions to the trial court to
resentence the defendant to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the term of two
years; see also State v. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279 (1921) where the
court reduced the sentence itself; State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 399, 253 P.2d 203 (1953)
where the court modified the judgment, and affimed it as so modified; State v.
Linebarger, 71 Idaho 255, 232 P.2d 669 (1951), where the appellate court reduced
the sentence in a rape conviction, claiming that the trial judge had abused his discretion.
ILLINOIS
No case could be found in which a legal but excessive sentence was challenged by
the appellate court. However, the Illinois judiciary has suggested that they would do
so where the penalty "is manifestly in excess of the proscription of [the constitutional
requirement] . . . that all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense."
People v. Smith, 14 IMI.2d 95, 150 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1958). See People v. Stevenson,
27 IMi.App. 2d 144, 169 N.E.2d 281 (1960); People v. Brendeland, 10 IMI.2d 469, 140
N.E.2d 708 (1957).
INDIANA
Despite a statute which says, "On appeal, the court may reverse, modify or afrm
the judgment appealed from, and may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial,"
I.N. ANN. STAT. § 9-2321 (1956), the Indiana Supreme Court has held that it can
not interfere with a legal punishment because of its severity, and that the defendant's
only remedy is executive clemency. Gingerich v. State, 226 Ind. 678, 83 N.E.2d 47
(1948).
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IOWA
§ 793.18 (1946) provides that upon appeal by the defendant, the court
"may affirm, reverse, or modify the judgment, or render such judgment as the district
court should have done, or order a new trial, or reduce the punishment, but cannot
increase it." In State v. O'Dell, 240 Iowa 1157, 39 N.W.2d 100 (1949), the court
said that a sentence will be reduced if it is disproportionate to the degree of guilt.
State v. Marcus, 240 Iowa 116, 34 N.W.2d 179 (1948), held a sentence excessive in
view of the fact that the defendant had children, was of good moral character, and
his reputation in the community was good. Therefore, the court modified the sentence
and affirmed the judgment as so modified. See also State v. Myers, 241 Iowa 670, 42
N.W.2d 79 (1950).
IOWA CODE

KANSAS
KANe. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1716 (1949) provides: "The appellate court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment appealed from, and may if necessary or proper
order a new trial." In Miller v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 688, 192 P.2d 147 (1948), the
supreme court said they will not disturb a legal sentence as long as it is not the
result of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive.
KENTUCKY
Ky. REv. STAT. § 21.055 (1955) gives the Kentucky courts the usual powers of reversal or modification of judgments. The Kentucky court has held it has no authority
to modify or reverse a sentence that is within the statutory, or legal limits. Galloway
v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 501, 273 S.W. 63 (1925). The case left the matter to
the chief executive's clemency powers.
LOUISIANA
In State v. Vittoria, 224 La. 258, 69 So. 2d 36 (1953), the court said that the
length of a sentence is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial judge, and
the appellate courts are without power to interfere except in cases of illegality (i.e.,
where the sentence is beyond statutory bounds).
MAINE
ANx. c. 148, § 32 (1954): "When a final judgment in any criminal
case is reversed upon a writ of error on account of error in the sentence, the court
may render such judgment therein as should have been rendered or may remand the
case for that purpose to the court before whom the conviction was had." No case
could be found which discussed the application of this statute to legal but excessive
sentences.
ME. REV. STAT.

MARYLAND
Maryland statutes dealing with appellate court power to review sentences are unclear
as to whether they authorize review of legal but excessive sentences as well as illegal
sentences. MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 17, art. 27, § 73 (1957). However, the cases have
held that the appellate court can not review legal but excessive sentences. Merchant
v. State, 217 Md. 61, 141 A.2d 487 (1958); Holt v. Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary, 223 Md. 654, 162 A.2d 743 (1960).
MASSACHUSETTS
MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 278, § 28(B) (1956), provides for an appeal to the appellate
division of the superior courts for the sole purpose of sentence review. This statute
gives the court the power to modify any sentence if it so desires. In Guerin v. Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 731, 162 N.E.2d 38 (1959), the appellate division modified a
sentence by allowing numerous sentences imposed upon the defendant to run con-
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currently, rather than consecutively, as originally decided by the trial court. See text
for further discussion of Massachusetts procedure.
MICHIGAN
This state does not permit appellate review of legal but excessive sentences. People v.
Connor, 348 Mich. 456, 83 N.W.2d 315 (1957); People v. Losinger, 331 Mich. 490,
50 N.W.2d 137 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 911 (1952).
MINNESOTA
Mni. STAT. ANN. § 632.06 (1947) provides: "If the court affirms the judgment, it
shall direct the sentence pronounced to be executed .... If it reverses such judgment,
it shall either direct a new trial, or that the defendant be absolutely discharged, as
the case may require." No cases could be found which interpreted the applicability
of this statute to legal but excessive sentences.
MISSISSIPPI
"One of the most important functions of the circuit judge in criminal cases is to
determine the punishment of the accused. His actions in this regard are not reviewable on appeal." Barnes v. State, 220 Miss. 248, 70 So. 2d 920, 921 (1954).
MISSOURI
Mo. Sup. Cr. Rs. 27.04, .05, .06 authorize the court to reduce the extent or duration
of the punishment assessed if, under the circumstances, it is greater than ought to be
infficted. State v. Burton, 355 Mo. 792, 198 S.W.2d 19 (1946) suggests that reversal
of a legal sentence is permissible upon a showing of abuse of discretion by the trial
judge, to be shown by evidence indicating motives of partiality, prejudice or oppression.
MONTANA
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-8210 (1947): "The court may reverse, affirm, or modify
the judgment or order appealed from, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all
of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and
may, if proper, order a new trial. In either case the cause must be remanded to the
district court with proper instruction." It has been held that this statute does not
give a Montana appellate court the power to vary legal but excessive sentences. State
v. Schaffer, 59 Mont. 403, 197 Pac. 986 (1921).
NEBRASKA
NEB. lPzv. STAT. § 29-2308 (1956) allows the supreme court to reduce the sentence
when in its opinion the sentence is excessive; it further provides that it shall be the
duty of the supreme court to enter such sentence against the accused as in its opinion
may be warranted by the evidence. Miller v. State, 169 Neb. 737, 100 N.W.2d 876
(1960), affirmed the supreme court's power to intervene in case of legal but excessive
sentences where there appears to have been an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
See also Muzik v. State, 99 Neb. 496, 156 N.W. 1056 (1916); Cryderman v. State,
101 Neb. 85, 161 N.W. 1045 (1917); Lillard v. State, 123 Neb. 838, 244 N.W. 640
(1932); Haswell v. State, 167 Neb. 169, 92 N.W.2d 161 (1958); Ysac v. State, 167
Neb. 24, 91 N.W.2d 49 (1958).
NEVADA
NEv. RPv. STAT. § 177.240 (1960) authorizes the appellate court to reverse, affirm or
modify a judgment appealed from; it may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial.
No case could be found discussing the application of the statute to legal but excessive
sentences.
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NEW HAMPSHIRE
"The supreme court shall have general superintendence of all courts of inferior
jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors and abuses, shall have exclusive authority to
issue writs of error, and may issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and
all other writs and processes to other courts, to corporations and to individuals, and
shall do and perform all the duties reasonably requisite and necessary to be done by
a court of final jurisdiction of questions of law and general superintendence of inferior
courts." N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490.4 (1955). No cases in point could be found.
However, it is suggested that the general supervisory power vested in the supreme
court might be a suffcient basis for the review of legal but excessive sentences.
NEW JERSEY
A recent case reviews the New Jersey history on the subject and concludes that the
superior court has the right to revise a sentence where it is manifestly excessive, even
though within authorized statutory limits. State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 424-32,
170 A.2d 830, 836-40 (Super. Ct. 1961).
NEW MEXICO
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-15-5 (1953) allows the supreme court either to affirm the
sentence and have it executed, or reverse the judgment and direct a new trial, or
discharge the defendant, according to the circumstances of the case. No cases were
found which interpret this statute in terms of appellate modification of legal but
excessive sentences.
NEW YORK
N.Y. CODE Crum. Pnoc. § 543 gives the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court the right to reduce any sentence to one which is within legal limits, or, if
necessary and proper, to order a new trial.
The courts have held that this statute gives the appellate division the power to
modify a legal but excessive sentence. People v. Potskowski, 298 N.Y. 299, 83 N.E.2d
125 (1948); People v. Gold, 7 App. Div. 2d 739, 180 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1958); People
v. Pannone, 8 App. Div. 2d 608, 184 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1959); People v. Downs, 5
App. Div. 2d 935, 172 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1958).
Due to a constitutional limitation on the reviewing power of the New York Court
of Appeals, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7, it has been held that, save for capital cases,
the court of appeals has no power to review the appropriateness of discretionary
sentences. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180 (1958); People v.
Speiser, 277 N.Y. 342, 14 N.E.2d 380 (1938). Therefore, the right to review legal
but excessive sentences has been left to the appellate division.
NORTH CAROLINA
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-11 (1953) allows the supreme court to render such sentence
or judgment as in their opinion the law requires.
It has been said that appellate modification is justified when there has been
manifest gross abuse by the trial court. State v. Stansbury, 230 N.C. 589, 55 S.E.2d
185 (1949); State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960).
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-28 (1960) gives the appellate courts the right to reverse,
affirm, or modify the judgment or order on appeal. State v. Holte, 87 N.W.2d 47
(N.D. 1957), held that as long as the sentence is within the statutory limits,
it is not reviewable, even though the jury's recommendation of leniency was disregarded by the trial court.
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OHIO
No cases could be found interpreting the statute, OMo REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.07
(1954), which gives the appellate courts the right to affirm or reverse the judgment
or any part of it.
OKLAHOMA
OsLA. STAT. AwN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1951) gives the appellate courts the power to
reverse, affirm or modify the judgment appealed from. The courts have construed
the statute to allow modification of excessive but legal sentences when the administration of justice so requires. Dickson v. State, 336 P.2d 1113 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959); Ratcliff v. State, 289 P.2d 152 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955); Shewmaker v. State,
329 P.2d 858 (1958); Watson v. State, 329 P.2d 865 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
OREGON
ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.050 (1955) allows an appeal on the grounds of excessiveness
where the defendant has pleaded guilty and has been convicted. The statute also
provides for a remanding to the court of first instance for proper resentencing when
the appellate court does reverse for excessiveness. State v. Peddicord, 209 Ore. 360,
306 P.2d 416 (1957).
However, after a trial upon a plea of not guilty, it has been held that the determination of a legal punishment is entirely within the "informed discretion of the trial judge."
State v. Gust, 218 Ore. 498, 345 P.2d 808 (1059).
PENNSYLVANIA
PA. STAT. tit. 17, § 41 (1936) gives the appellate courts the power to reverse,
modify, or affirm a lower court judgment. The supreme court has held that this
statute gives appellate courts the power to modify legal but excessive sentences. Commonwealth v. Williams, 402 Pa. 48, 166 A.2d 44 (1960); Commonwealth v. Cater,
396 Pa. 172, 152 A.2d 259 (1959); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d
241 (1959); Commonwealth v. Hawk, 328 Pa. 417, 196 At. 5 (1938); Commonwealth
v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 AU. 733 (1932); see PA. STAT. tit. 18, § 4701 (Supp.
1959) (capital sentencing); text discussion of Pensylvania.

RHODE ISLAND
No cases could be found interpreting the general statute, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 8-1-2
(1956), allowing appellate courts to correct and prevent errors and abuses.
SOUTH CAROLINA
In interpreting S.C. CODE § 7-427 (1952), which grants appellate power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment, the courts have held that there was no grant of
jurisdiction to correct a legal but allegedly excessive sentence, unless it is the result
of partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive. State v. Bell, 215 S.C. 311,
54 S.E.2d 900 (1949); State v. Fleming, 228 S.C. 129, 89 S.E.2d 104 (1955).
SOUTH DAKOTA
State v. McFall, 75 S.D. 630, 71 N.W.2d 299 (1955), held that where the sentence
imposed is within permitted statutory limits, the discretion of the trial court in fixing
the term is not reviewable.
TENNESSEE
Where the judge imposes the sentence, the appellate court has the right to review
legal but excessive sentences. Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 361, 215 S.W.2d 785 (1948).
In a misdemeanor conviction, however, where the defendant avails himself of the
right to have the jury impose the punishment, TENN. CODE ANw. § 40-2704 (1956),
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there is no appellate review of such sentences, if legal. Ryall v. State, 204 Tenn. 422,
321 S.W.2d 809 (1959); Thompson v. State, 197 Tenn. 112, 270 S.W.2d 379 (1954).
TEXAS
Despite TEE. Pr. CODE A-N. art. 847 (1950), which gives appellate courts the power
to affirm or reverse, as the law and nature of the case may require, the appellate courts
have held excessive sentences to be outside the scope of review. Lewallen v. State, 166
Tex. Crim. 297, 313 S.W.2d 293 (1958); Manning v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 329, 284
S.W.2d 903 (1955).
UTAH
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-42-3 (1953) gives the appellate courts power to reverse,
affirm or modify the judgment. No cases interpreting this statute could be found.
VERMONT
A Vermont statute provides that upon appeal to the supreme court the judgment and
sentence of the lower court may be enforced. However, if error is found, the judgment
and sentence of the lower court shall be reversed and judgment of acquittal rendered
by the supreme court or the cause may be remanded to the lower court for a new
trial. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7402 (1958). No case on point could be found.
VIRGINIA
VA. CODE AwN. § 19.1-288 (1950) gives the appellate court the power to affirm the
judgment, if there is no error therein, or to reverse it in whole or in part. No cases
on point could be found. Nevertheless, in Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357,
38 S.E.2d 479 (1946) the court held that a revocation of a suspended sentence is
reviewable, though only upon clear showing of abuse of discretion.
WASHINGTON
On appeal from denial of a motion to the trial court to vacate the sentence and
judgment, the supreme court held the trial court's refusal not reviewable in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. State v. Roff, 44 Wash. 2d 309, 266 P.2d 1059 (1954).
See also WAsH. Sup. CT. APP. R. 16, which authorizes the supreme court to affirm,
modify or reverse any judgment.
WEST VIRGINIA
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5811 (1961) allows the supreme court to reverse, affirm or
modify any judgment. No case on point could be found.
WISCONSIN
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 251.17 (1957) gives the appellate court the power either to
pronounce the proper judgment or to remit to the court below. Nevertheless, the
Wisconsin court has refused to permit appellate review of legal but excessive sentences.
State v. Sullivan, 241 Wis. 276, 5 N.W.2d 798 (1942), states that the trial court's
imposition of a sentence more severe than the appellate court would have imposed
creates no right to disturb such a discretionary sentence.
WYOMING
The supreme court is bound by the jury-imposed punishment, even though the court
may disagree with it. State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 63, 300 P.2d 567 (1956); Hahn v.
State, 78 Wyo. 258, 322 P.2d 896 (1958). A dictum in State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo.
111, 253 Pac. 14 (1927), states that if the trial court abuses its discretion, the
appellate court may modify a legal sentence. See also Wyo. R. Civ. P. 72; Wyo. STAT.
AwN. § 7-292 (1957) (which applies the civil rule to criminal cases).
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The first appeal above trial level in
court of appeals. D.C. CODE Amr.
affim, reverse, or modify the order
on point were found.
Further appeals go to the federal
applies. See text discussion for the

the District of Columbia goes to the municipal
§ 11-722 (1951) allows the appellate court to
or judgment in accordance with law. No cases
courts, where the law of the federal jurisdiction
applicable law in the federal jurisdiction.

